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RECENT CASES
DECEDENTS' ESTATES-CONCLUSIVENESS OF PROBATE
Cyrus W. Palm, decedent, died on February 14, 1946, and on September 30,
1946, the register of wills admitted to probate as the last will and testament
of the deceased, a document dated April 2, 1941. On March 6, 1950, more than

three years after probate, an appeal was taken from probate of this will, averring
discovery of a later purported will, dated April 9, 1941. An appeal was allowed.,
The court was confronted with 'the question whether to entertain an appeal
where the appeal was filed three and one-half years after probate and contained
no allegations of fraud or of uncertainty of the probate record.
Initially it is to be remembered that the decree of a register of wills is in rem
and cannot be collaterally attacked;2 that section 208 of the Register of Wills Act
of 1951 provides a two year appeal period. 8
It is well settled that a later will which is wholly inconsistent with an earlier
will revokes that earlier will. 4 It follows from this that both wills would not be
permitted to stand nor both be probated as the will of the testator. This was the
situation presented in Palm Estate.5 But suppose a testator bequeaths his personal
property by one will and his real estate by another, or if the two wills dispose of different property, either personal or real. 6 In such circumstances the wills would not
be inconsistent with one another and the later will would not revoke the former
in the absence of an express revocation clause. 7 Both such wills would be permitted to stand and both could be probated. 8 A problem arises when there is
a partial inconsistency between two wills. When the wills partially overlap is there
a partial or a total revocation of the earlier will? Can both wills be probated as
far as they are not inconsistent with each other?9 The two wills involved in Palm
Estate both of which were executed by mark, were wholly inconsistent, thus,
only one may be probated.
Sections 21 (a) and 16 (a) of the Register of Wills Act of 1917 provide an
appeal period of two years. Section 21 (a) reads "From all judicial acts and proceedings of the several registers . . .appeals may be taken to the Orphans' Court

of the respective county within the term of two years." This provision corresponds
I Palm Estate, 1 Fid. Rep. 572.

2 Cochran v. Young, 104 Pa. 333; Sebik's Estate, 300 Pa. 45; Kern's Estate, 212 Pa. 57.

8 Register of Wills Act of 1951, § 208.
4 Burtt Will, 353 Pa. 217; McClure's Estate, 309 Pa. 370.
5 The wills in Palm Estate both contained a residuary clause and each will disposed of the- entire
estate as discovered by examination of the records in the Register of Wills Office in Dauphin
County Court House.
6 Rife's Appeal, 110 Pa. 232.
7/Wolfe's Will, 185 N. C. 563, 117 S. E. 804.
8 Register of Wills Act of 1951, § 303 (b).
9 See Bregy, "Intestate Wills & Estates Acts of 1947," pp. 2357-2359.
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with section 208 of the Register of Wills Act of 1951. Further, section 16(a) of
the 1917 Act provides that:
"The probate, or refusal of probate by the Register of the proper
county of any Will or codicil thereto, shall be conclusive as to all property, real or personal, devised or bequeathed by such Will or codicil or
other paper, unless, within two years from the date of such probate or
refusal of probate, those interested shall appeal from the decree of register."
Section 303 (b) of the Register of Wills Act of 1951 contains similar language.
Can the decision in Palm Estate be justified on the ground that it comes within
the well-recognized exceptions to the two year appeal period?
There are no exceptions to be found in the Register of Wills Act itself. Pennsylvania cases, however, provide two. In Culbertson's Estate,10 the court, speaking
through Justice Sadler, allowed an appeal from a decree of probate after twelve,
years concluding that:
"The jurisdiction of the Register is limited to the determination as
to whether the payer presented has been legally executed as the Will
of the deceased, and if his action is induced by fraud the Order following is void and may be set aside."
The court in Robert's Estate reaffirms the decision in Cull.ertson's Etate"
in saying:
"It is true that, ordinarily, after two years no appeal can be taken
from the probate of a Will, but in the case of forged instruments there
may be an appeal in the discretion of the Court as a matter ex'gratia."1 2
It appears then that in cases of fraud the two year appeal period may be
ignored. 13
The only other exception is presented in the interesting case of Rockett Will.1 4
The register in this case failed to decide whether the marginal notations made on
the will after its execution were or were not part of the will. In allowing the
appeal after the two year appeal period had expired the court remarked that:
"The silence of the decree in this connection makes it capable of a
double interpretation, either that the clause was or was not revoked, and
thus a proper distribution could not be made at the audit. . . .Where
a judgment or decree lacks such certainty and is absolutely unintelligible,
it is a nullity."
Thus the only exceptions to the two year statutory appeal period are:
(1) where the original probate decree was induced by fraud, or
(2) the original probate record itself made the will uncertain.
10 301 Pa. 438.

11 301 Pa. 438.
12 309 Pa. 389, 392.

18 Accord, Lowery's Estate 260 D. & C. (Pa.) 200.
14 348 Pa. 445.
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The problem in Palm Estate does not fall within either of these well-settled
exceptions. It involves a later-discovered will disposing of the entire estate and
there is no allegation of fraud or of an uncertain probate decree. It could be inferred then that since Palm Estate did not constitute an exception to the appeal
period of two years it was then subject to the statutory limitation. This inference
is unnecessary since there is a wealth of case authority for the proposition that
the appeal period provided for in the Register of Wills Acts applies and controls
in the case of later discovered wills.15 For example, in Baker's Estate18 the court
refused to allow an appeal from probate after the appeal period had passed saying:
'The Will of 13 December, 1892, has been probated as the testatators Last Will and Testament; that adjudication has remained unappealed from for more than three years (two years under the 1917 and
1951 Register of Wills Acts) and the end of the controversy as to it
has been reached. It could not be superseded by the last Will if recovered." (Parenthetical material added.)
The decision in Palm Estate is therefore contrary to the statutory language
of the Register of Wills Act and the overwhelming case authority on the subject.
The court relied on Lowry's Estate'7 and Roberts' Estate' 8 both of which involved
fraud and thus were within the exceptions. Judge Richards refers to McManus's
Estate'9 in which case the court dismissed the appeal after the appeal period of
two years under the Register of Wills Act of 1917 on the ground that the petitioner was guilty .of lachcs. The language of the court later in the opinion concerning an appeal after the two year period "in the discretion of the court as a matter ex gratia" was dicta. In Sebik's Estate20 the petitioner attempted to probate
a later found will without taking the necessary appeal. The court refused the
second probate on this ground alone and any language concerning the problem
in Palm's Estate was dicta.
The only case cited by Judge Richards to support his decision was Hetzel's
Estate.2 ' Judge Trimble of the Allegheny County Orphans' Court in that case
allowed an appeal from the earlier probated will to permit probate of a later dated
will and codicils to that later dated will after the appeal period of two years had
lapsed. He obviously misconstrued the language of section 16(b) of the Register of Wills Act of 1917 which reads "The last Will of any decedent may be offered for probate at any time.

.

." to apply even in the case where another will

had been probated previously. Clearly sections 21(a) and 16 (a) applied to
such cases and fixed a two year appeal period while 16(b) (Section 303 (a)
of the 1951 Act) applied only in those cases where there has been no prior pro16 Cochran v. Young, 104 Pa. 333; Sebik's Estate, 300 Pa. 45; Kiester's Estate, 12 Dist. 232;
Terry's Estate, 7 D. & C. (Pa.)
16 244 Pa. 350, 353.
17 26 D. & C. (Pa.) 200.
18 309 Pa. 389.
19 285 Pa. 74.
20 300 Pa. 45.
21 37 D. & C. (Pa.) 440.

350.
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bated will. We are more inclined to agree with Judge Prather of Crawford County
who in Terry's Estate22 said that:
"If this (appeal from the original probate) can be done after seventeen years of repose in an atmosphere of finality and conclusiveness, or,
as it is urged in the language of the statute, such Will may be offered
for probate 'at any time,' (Section 16 (b) ), and, hence, should be received for probate at any time, then its utmost reach is infinity. The
legislature could never have intended that this language could be carved
out of its context and given an interpretation destructive of the spirit
and purpose of the section in its entirety." (Parenthetical material added.)
Judge Richards apparently fails to distinguish between cases of fraud and
the situation before him, that of a later-discovered will. Apparently he relies too
strongly on dicta to support his decision and the only case in all fours with his
own, Heizel's Estate,23 is bad law. He completely ignores the cases from Cochr'an
v. Young 24 to the present which hold unequivocally that in cases of later found
wills the appeal period of two years is to b'e strictly enforced.
The decision then in Palm Estate, as in Hetzel's Estate, is completely contrary
to the existing law. The Register of Fills Act sets a time limit of two years for
appeals from probate decrees. The cases carve out two well settled exceptions
to this statutory appeal period, one in the case of fraudulent wills and th'e other in
the cases of wills made uncertain by the probate decree. In cases of later found
wills, as is the present case, there is overwhelming case authority for the proposition that such appeals are subject to the statutory appeal period.
Obviously th'e court in Palm Estate was impressed by the "natural" justice that
would result in that case by allowing such an appeal. This can be readily deduced
by the following language of the case:
"No account had been filed, no distribution had been made and
no real estate had been sold or mortgaged. On principles of justice and
equity, there is no reason to question the fact that the later Will is in fact
and in law the Last Will of the decedent. Neither do we believe that the
sections of the Register of Wills Act above quoted, in view of the decisions, prohibit the opening of the probate of the earlier Will and the
In fact, to us, this seems to be
tendering of the later Will for probate.
' '2 5
essential in the interest of justice.
The answer to such rationalization appears in th'e following well chosen
language from another case on another phase of law, "It seems to be a hard case,
but there is no remedy without making the bad law, which such cases are said to
26
invite."
Robert L. Myers, III
Member of the Senior Class
22 7 D. & C. (Pa.) 350, 352.
23 37 D. & C. (Pa.) 440.
24 104 Pa. 333.
25 1 Fid. Rep. 572, 578.
26 Emernecker's Estate, 218 Pa. 369.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEWO

VOL. 57

TAXATION-TIME TO TAKE EMBEZZLEMENT LOSSES
The recent decision in Alison v. United States' decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States on December 8, 1952, has reversed an old and well established rule of tax law. The old rule was that embezzlement losses must be taken
as deductions in the year in which the embezzlement occurs, although they were
not discovered until a later year. 2 The latter rule became firmly established by delerence to the rulings of the Commissioner and by a long line of lower court
decisions.
The facts of the Alison case briefly stated are as follows:
On or about March 11, 1942, the taxpayer filed her income tax return for the calendar year 1941. On March 30, 1943, the taxpayer filed a
claim for refund of the amount of tax paid for the year 1942, plus interest which was based on a claimed deduction of $21,804.90. The court
made the following finding of fact.
One J. W. Cree, prior to his death on November 24, 1942, was the

manager of several trust estates. Among his clients was the taxpayer in
this case. When taxpayer was a minor Mr. Cree was her guardian and
after she became of age Mr. Cree continued as her business agent and
advisor. In 1941, shortly after the death of Mr. Cree, taxpayer discovered that he had embezzled from her the sum of $30,155.27. Certain
sums were recovered by the taxpayer which left a net loss to her in the
amount of $21,804.90 which she claimed as the deduction from her gross
income for the taxable year of 1941. The net loss was established on
November 18, 1942. The net amount embezzled for each year from
1931 to 1940 inclusive was determined from Cree's books. No money
was taken by Cree during the year 1941.

The taxpayer had no reason to suspect that any of her funds were
being embezzled by Cree and had no knowledge of such embezzlement
until after his death on November 24, 1941. Throughout the period
above mentioned, Cree was a director in several banks and prominent in
real estate and business circles in the city of Pittsburgh. He enjoyed substantial credit and had the reputation of meeting all his obligations as
they accrued.
The judge of the United States District Court, Western District of Pennsylvania, in 97 F. Supp. 959 (1951) held, that the taxpayer was not 'entitled to
a deduction of any part of the loss of $21,804.90 in the taxable year 1941. The
judge so held because he felt compelled to do so by the Third Circuit's decision
in First National Bank of Sharon, Pennsylvania v. Heiner, 66 F.2d 925, and not
because his own views were in accord with the holding.

1 Alison v. United States, 344 U.S. 167, (1952).
2 Bentley and Zimmerman, 5 B.T.A. 314 (1926); John H. Farish, 7 B.T.A. 793 (1927); Peterson Linotyping Co., 10 B.T.A. 542 (1928); First Nat'l. Bank of Sharon, Pa. v. Heiner, Collector
of Internal Revenue, 66 F.2d. 925 (3rd Cir., 1933).
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The Supreme Court reversed this holding, stating that:
"...under the provisions of the I. R. C. Sec. 23 (e) (f) authorizing deductions from gross income for losses sustained during the taxable year, when embezzlements by trusted employees were not discovered for several years, sums embezzled might be taken as losses in the
year in which embezzlements were discovered ......
The Court explained this holding by saying:
".. .the terms embezzlement and loss are not synonymous. The theft
occurs, but whether there is a loss may remain uncertain. One whose
funds have been embezzled may pursue the wrongdoer and recover his
property in whole or in part....
..Evnts in the Alison case show the practical value of this right
of recovery. A substantial proportion of the embezzled funds was recovered in 1941, ten years after the first embezzlement occurred. This recovery alone is ample refutation of the view that a loss is inevitably
'sustained' at the very time an embezzlement is committed."
ThL Court went on to say that whether and when a deductible loss results
from an embezzlement is a question of fact, and as a practical matter must be
decided according to the surrounding circumstances. It was clearly indicated that
an inflexible rule was not needed nor required by the statute, since the Treasury
for years has administered the tax law under regulations saying that deductions
shall "ordinarily" be taken in the year of an embezzlement. 3 The Court explained
that "ordinarily" does not mean "always."
This holding corrects the unjust and oppressive consequences which resulted
under the old rule. The major premise of the old rule was that a loss from embezzlement resulted only in the year the theft occurred and, therefore, a deduction
could be taken only in that year, regardless of when the embezzlement was discovered. The old rule was based on sound and logical reasoning, i.e., to prevent a
taxpayer from taking a loss in any year which might serve his interest. However,
here, as in many other instances, the application of a rigid, inelastic rule without
giving due consideration to other important factors in the case at hand, Ild to unjust results. Such as here, where the taxpayer is deprived of a deduction because
he failed to discover the embezzlement, through no fault of his own, until too
late to file an amended return and to claim a refund for the year in which the
4
money was taken.
The judges, and to be sure the taxpayers, have not wholeheartedly
with the old rule and from its inception a judicial erosive action has been
place, aimed at making its application more palatable. This is evidenced
holding of the Boston Consolidated Gas case 5 which allowed a deduction

agreed
taking
in the
in the

8 U.S. Treasury Reg. 111, 29.43-2.
4 Statute of Limitations upon filing a claim for refund in case of a loss deduction is 3 years after
filing the return, I.R.C., § 322 (b) (1).
5 Boston Consolidated Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 473 (1st Cie., 1942).
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year of discovery where there was no way of identifying the year in which embezzlement occurred. The court there said:
.the statute should with a view of avoiding, so far as possible,
unjust and oppressive consequences, be not inelastically or rigidly applied, and since the petitioner could not file amended returns for the former years, because of inability to determine the actual dates of the different acts of embezzlement, the situation is so extraordinary that its
total net loss may be deducted in the year when the loss is discovered and
its extent determined ....
(Emphasis mine.)
This holding was also affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States
on Declember 8, 1952, in the case of'UqitedStates v. Stevenson-Chislett Inc.6 which

was heard along with the Alison case.
With the holdings of these two cases it seems safe to conclude that a taxpayer can in the future take a deduction for loss from embezzlement in the year
in which the embezzlement is discovered whether or not he can ascertain the
'exact amount and the actual dates of the different acts of embezzlement.
DonaId R. Mikesell
Member of the Senior Class

CONTRACTS-PRESUMPTION OF PAYMENT
FROM LAPSE- OF TIME
It is a well settled rule of law that a delay of twenty years in enforcing a
claim on a debt raises a presumption that the debt has b'een paid1 and the creditor then has the burden of proving non-payment. 2 A recent Pennsylvania ease"
presented the question of. whether any such presumption of payment arises where
the delay is for a long period of time but less than twenty years.
In this case the defendant executed two judgment notes in 1929. fJudgment
was entered on each of these notes in 1931. In 1950 the plaintiff issued writs of
scire jacias to revive the Hiens of judgments. Defendant then filed an affidavit
of defence pleading, inter alia, that by virtue of the long lapse of time the judgments were presumed to b'c paid. There was no indication of any previous demand
for payment.
The court held that the twenty year period did not begin to run until the
judgments were legally collectible, and therefore, since only nineteen years had
elapsed, that the delay alone did not give rise to a presumption of payment. The
court went on to say that a presumption of payment "may arise in less than twenty
A United States v. Stevenson-Chislett, Inc., 344 U.S. 167 (1952).

1 40 Am. Jur., Payment § 247.

Ibid § 251.
8 Brookes v. Rudolph, 371 Pa. 21, 88 A.2d 907 (1952).

2
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but not because of the delay alone. It arises from facts other than the delay." 4. In
other words, where there are, in addition to a long delay, circumstances which
tend to show that the debt has probably been paid, then the presumption will
arise. It was held, however, that the fact that the plaintiff made no demand for
payment for nineteen years was not a circumstance which alone would support
this presumption.
This case raises the problem of just what additional circumstances must be
shown in order to give rise to this presumption. In the case of Hughes v. Hughes5
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that the circumstances must be "persuasive
that the time would not have been suffered to clapse had the d'ebt remained unpaid." 6 It was suggested in the opinion that proof that the obligor was solvent
and able to pay and that the obligee was in n'eedy circums-tances would ordinarily
be sufficient, but the court held that the mere fact that the obligor gave two mortgages on his property and that the obligee bought a home after the debt was due
were not sufficient to show that the latter needed the money nor that the former
was able to pay, and were therefore not persuasive that the debt had been paid.
In a later case7 the court held that proof that a judgment debtor was Lngaged in the real estate business, that he had numerous properties conveyed to
him in his own name and that he was fully able to pay was sufficient to make the
presumption applicable. The delay in this case was only thirteen years and there
was no evidence that the creditor was in needy circumstances.
ThL Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also held that the fact that land which
was subject to the lien of a judgment was sold at a sheriff's sale and that- the
judgment creditor was entitled to payment out of the funds derived therefrom
were circumstances which tended to show payment and therefore gave rise to the
presumption. 8
The lack of any demand for payment of a judgment for nineteen years was
emphasized as a circumstance which would aid the presumption in the case of
Hess v. Frankenfield.9 Here there was the added fact that the creditor had been
given a written release by the sole heir, other than the obligor, of the deceased
obligee's estate. There was some doubt as to the validity of this paper to actually
operate as a release of the judgment but the court held that it was nonetheless indicative of payment and, coupled with the lack of demand, was sufficient to support the presumption that the debt had been paid.
In a more recent case 10 there was, in addition to a nineteen year d'elay, evidence that the obligee had paid large sums of money to the obligor at various
4 371 Pa. 21, 25, 88 A.2d 907, 909.
5 54 Pa. 240 (1867).
6 Ibid at 242.
7 208 Pa. 144, 57 A. 342 (1904).

8 Moore v. Smith, 81 Pa. 182 (1876).
9 106 Pa. 440 (i884).
10 In re Conrad's Estate, 333 Pa. 561, 3 A.2d 697 (1938).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

VOL. 57

times during the nineteen years and at no time did he make any demand for payment. The evidence also showed that the obligor had lived for eighteen years after the claim became due and now it was being presented against his estate. The
court in holding that the circumstances gave rise to the presumption said:
"... .any circumstance which shows conduct on the part of the obligee inconsistent v;ith the existence of the debt as a valid claim will, with
the delay, support the inference that the obligation has been paid ....
The corroborative circumstances take on greater significance with the passage of time.""1
In the same opinion the court went on to point out that the fact that the
claim is being presented against the estate of a deceased debtor, though not alone
sufficient, does aid the presumption and only "slight additional evidence is required in such a case."'? Logically, of course, the fact that the debtor has died
would not seem to be persuasive that the debt has been paid nor would it seem
to be "conduct . . . inconsistent with the existence of the debt as a valid claim,"
but the Pennsylvania courts have tended to view with suspicion the claim of a
creditor who waits until his debtor dies before attempting to collect. 18
One further problem should be considered in connection with this presumption and that is the effect that it will have. Prior to the Conrad case, supra, the
Pennsylvania courts uniformly treated it as a presumption of fact; i.e., the jury
will be permitted to infer the fact of payment. It had no effect on the burden of
proof. 14 Professor Wigmore' 5 points out that a so-called presumption of
fact is not actually a presumption at all since the jury is not required to give it
any weight, even where there is no rebutting evidence. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court took this same position in the case of Watkins v. PrudentialInsurance Co.16
In the Conrad case, however, the court, though labelling it a "factual" presumption, treated it as a presumption of law and held it to be conclusive in the
absence of rebutting evidence. After noting the circumstances which gave rise to
the "inference" of payment, the court said:
"All this is not only inconsistent with the existence of a valid debt
on the long overdue note of $10,000 but would conclusively show payment. There7 is nothing on the record that would rebut this factual presumption."'
The court then held that the decision of the lower court permitting recovery should be reversed and the claim disallowed.
In view of the great number of cases which say that this "presumption" which
arises in less than twenty years is no more than a permissible inference it would
11 333 Pa. 561, 567, 3 A.2d 697, 701.

12 Ibid.

18 See, e.g., Bechdel's Estate, 344 Pa. 139, 23 A.2d 859 (1942); Farrell Estate, 361 Pa. 154,
63 A.2d 5 (1949).
14 See cases cited in notes 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, supra.
16 9 Wigmore on Evidence § 2491 (3d ed., 1940).
16 315 Pa. 497, 500, 173 A. 644, 646 (1934).
17 See n.11, supra.
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seem that the decision in the Conrad case on this point will probably not be followed, especially since the court in that case did cite the Hughes and Hess cases,
supra, with approval. It should be noted, however, that the Conrad case is the
latest holding in Pennsylvania on this point.18
The Conrad case is merely one example of the confusion which has resulted
from labelling something a "presumption" which is not really a presumption at
all. For example, there are cases where the court spoke of the presumption which
arises after twenty years as a presumption "of fact" but treated it as a real presumption, i.e., one which reverses the burden of proof. 19 It would therefore seem
proper to suggest that the term "presumption of fact" should be discarded and a
more accurate term such as "permissible inference" be used to refer to the rule
which permits the jury to infer the fact of' payment when the debt is less than
twenty years old. This is the view taken by Professor Wigmore who points out
that the term "presumption of fact" is based solely on "historical usage." 20
In conclusion it must be admitted that it is impossible to lay down any fixed
rule of law as to when the jury will be permitted to infer the fact of payment where
there is no direct evidence as to this fact. It can only be said that the following
are circumstances which are to some extent persuasive that a long overdue debt
has been paid:
(1) the fact that the obligee was in needy circumstances;
(2) the fact that the obligor was solvent, owned property and was otherwise
fully able to pay;
(3) the fact that the obligee could have obtained satisfaction of his claim
from the proceeds of a sheriff's sale of realty which was subject to the lien of the
judgment debt;
(4) the lack of any prior demand or attempt to collect;
(5) an admission by the obligee that the debt was no longer owed, such as a
written release;
(6) payment by the obligee to the obligor of sums of money without demanding satisfaction of the claim; and
(7) the fact that the claim is being presented against the estate of a deceased obligor.
Whether the proof of any one or combination of these circumstances will be
sufficient to have the issue of payment submitted to the jury must necessarily depend on all the circumstances of the case.
Richard Morton
Member of the Middler Class
18 There is a dictum to the same effect in Snyder's Estate, 368 Pa. 393, 396, 84 A.2d 318, 321 (1951).
19 See, e.g., Grenet's Estate, 332 Pa. 111, 2 A.2d 707 (1938); Smith's Estate, 343 Pa. 539, 23
A.2d 450.
20 See n. 15, supra.
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-RIGHT OF WIFE TO RECOVER
SUMS SPENT FOR SUPPORT OF SELF AND CHILD
In the case of Adler v. Adler, 171 Pa. Super. 508, 90 A.2d 389 (1952), the
court held that a wife may maintain an action in assumpsit against her husband
to recover moneys expended by her out of her separate estaee for supplying necessaries for herself and her two minor children. The husband had deserted the
wife without cause in June, 1950 and she obtained a support order in June, 1951.
Sums from her separate estate were spent during that year for food, clothing and
"other necessaries."
The duty of a husband to provide for
been long recognized by courts of law,1 but
cipal case to permit the wife to recover when
be the latest logical ramification of a theory

his wife and famiily is one that has
the exact approach used in the prinshe fulfills that obligation appears to
long applied by Pennsylvania courts.

Since the common law did not generally allow a wife to sue her husband,
she had no remedy for any claim against him until statutes were passed removing
the disabilities of a married woman. However, .the law did impose a quasi-contractual liability upon the husband to third persons furnishing the deserted wife
with those things needed for human subsistence, chiefly on the theory that the
wife was an "agent" of the husband for the purpose of purchasing household
necessaries, and that mere separation of husband and wife did not extinguish the
"agency." 2
At the early common law, the only necessaries were food, lodging and raiment, and it had to be proved by the complaining party that the alleged necessaries were, in fact, needed by the wife or child.3 Money was not regarded as
a necessary, but could be recovered in equity if it were shown that the money was
actually used to purchase necessaries. 4 The more prcvalent view taken today,
and the view upheld by the Pennsylvania decisions, is that the scope of necessaries
is measured not only by those essentials needed to sustain life, but also by the
things to which the family is accustomed with reference to the husband's "pecuniary ability, honestly exercised, or his pecuniary resources." 5 The question of
whether a given object is a necessary is usually decided by the jury.6

I Cunningham v. Irwin, 7 S. & R. 247 (Pa., 1821) ; Walker v. Simpson, 7 W. & S. 83 (Pa., 1844);
Monahan v. Auman, 39 Pa. Super. 150 (1909).
2 Allen v. Reider, 41 Pa. Super. 534 (1910) ; Boggs & Buhr v. Kamons, 109 Pa. Super. 487, 167
A. 373 (1933). See also: Restatement of Restitution, § 76 ill.
5, and §§ 113-117.
3 Bainbridge v. Pickering, 2 W.BI. 1325; Cunningham v. Irwin, supra.
4 Walker v. Simpson, supra; Pletcher v. Pletcher, 13 D. & C. 161 (Pa., 1929) ; Jones v. Markley, 92 Pa. Super. 348 (1928) where a mere statement on the part of the wife that the money will
be used for the purchase of necessaries was held insufficient.
5 Keller v. Phillips, 39 N.Y. 351, 354 (1861); Commonwealth ex rel. Shotz v. Shotz, 130 Pa.
Super. 561, 198 A. 472 (1938).
6 Levison v. Davis, 212 Pa. 148, 61 A. 819 (1905).
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This duty on the part of the husband is an absolute duty, and may be enforced even if the wife has a sufficient separate estate of her own and could pro7
vide in part, or in whole, the necessaries required.
It should be noted that, in the cases leading up to the principal case, the
person seeking restitution has generally been a third party. Evidently, the reason
for that was that until the Act of 1913 was passed enabling the wife to sue her
husband "on any cause of action," it was felt that she could not sue him at all
except for divorce, or in a proceeding to protect and recover her separate property.9 And, since the passage of the Act of 1913, Pennsylvania courts have held
that the wife is to be regarded as a creditor. 19
However, there seems to be a second course of action possible for a married woman to recover under circumstances similar to the principal case which
does not involve the purely procedural effects of the Act of 1913. Under the
Act of 1718, wives of "mariners or others. . .gone to sea" may attach their husband's estate in execution of debts incurred "for their support and maintenance"
if their husbands desert them.1 1 The class of married women under that statute
was extended by the Act of 185.5 to include any woman who has been deserted
by her husband. 12 Following these statutes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
1871 held that where a husband deserts his wife and child and refuses to support
them, the wife may sue the husband for moneys expended for necessaries in support of herself and the child. 18 Thus, we see that prior to the statute which merely

7 Cunningham v. Irwin, supra; Commonwealth v. Gilleland, 93 Pa. Super. 307 (1928); Commonwealth ex rel. Shotz v. Shotz, supra.
8 Act of 1913, P.L. 146, 48 P. S. 114.
9 Act of 1893, P.L. 344, 48 P. S. 111.
10 Turner v. Turner, 169 Pa. Super. 120, 82 A.2d 320 (1951).
11 Act of February 22, 1718 entitled "An Act Concerning Feme Sole Traders", 3 Pa. Stat. At Large
157, 1 Sm.L. 99, 48 P. S. 41, § 4 stating: ". . .ifsuch absent husband, having his health and
liberty, stay away so long from his wife and children, without making such provision for their
maintenance before or after his going away, till they are like to become chargeable to the town
or place where they inhabit, or in case such husband doth or shall live in adultery, or cohabit unlawfully with another woman, and refuses or neglects, within seven years next after his going to
sea or departing this province, to return to his wife and cohabit with her again, then and in every
such case the lands, tenements and estate belonging to such husband shall be. . taken in execution to satisfy any sum or sums of money which the wives of such husbands, or guardians of their
children, shall necessarily expend or lay out for their support and maintenance; which execution
shall be founded upon process of attachment against such estate, wherein the absent husband shall
he made defendant."
12 Act of 1855, P.L. 430, 48 P. S. 42 stated that "Whensoever any husband, from drunkenness,
profligacy or other cause, shall neglect or refuse to provide for his wife, or shall desert her, she
shall have all the rights and privileges secured to a feme sole trader, under the Act of February
22, 1718." See also: Markley v. Wartman, 9 Phila. 236 (Pa., 1874) ; Cleaver v. Shcetz, 70 Pa. 496
(1872).
11 Reilley v. Reilley, 4 Brewster 169 (Pa., 1871), which also stated that it was not necessary
that the husband should be a mariner, or that the wife obtain a decree declaring her a feme sole
trader, or that the wife make her living by shoplkeeping, or that the husband should cohabit with
another woman. See also: Seldomridge v. Seldomridge, 14 D. & C. 122 (Pa., 1930); In re Bremer,
3 D. & C. 685 (Pa., 1923).
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gave the wife the ability to sue on a restitutional basis, Pennsylvania had statutes
which gave the wife the ability to sue her husband plus giving her a specific cause
of action. The significance of that early decision and the statutes upon which it
was based seems to have been lost with the sweeping removal of all the disabilities of a married woman afforded by the Act of 1913, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court in the Adler case traces the wife's ability to sue as being based solely upon
the Act of 1913 and the Act of 1893, and her right to sue as being based upon a
restitutional theory.
The ability of the wife to sue her husband for moneys thus expended ap;
pears to be limited to the period between the act of desertion and the granting
of the support order. Although Pennsylvania courts have -held that a husband
may be committed to prison in contempt of court for refusal to pay a support order, and that a wife may sue him in assumpsit to recover the accrued payments
subsequent to his release, 14 it does not appear that she could recover whire there
has been a support order granted and she spends money over that amount. It has
been held that third persons furnishing the wife with necessaries over and above
the amount allowed her by the court could not recover from the husband, 15 and,
since the wife's right to recovery is now based upon the fact that she supplies
the necessaries rather than the third person, it would not be very likely that she
would be permitted to recover.
When a third person has sought restitution, it is only natural that he should
be burdened with proof of the fact that he is entitled to it. The early cases have
set up five main requisites which must be proved before recovery can be had by
a third ,person:
(1) that the husband deserted or drove the wife away without just
cause;
(2) that such husband failed to provide necessaries for the wife;
(3) that the party seeking recovery did furnish such necessaries;
(4) that the things provided were really necessaries, or, if money
was given, that the money was actually used for the purchase of necessaries; and
(5) that he expected payment for furnishing such necessaries. 16
In cases where the issue is in doubt, the courts have also required the person
seeking recovery to prove that the wife did not herself contract to pay for such
14 Commonwealth v. Rowe, 28 Dist. Rep. 496 (Pa.,
Liuzzi, 142 Pa. Super. 239, 15 A.2d 738.

1919); Commonwealth ex rel. Liuzzi v.

15 Cany v. Patton, 2 Ashmead 140 (Pa., 1831); Commonwealth v. Surovitz, 148 Pa. Super. 342,
25 A.2d 761 (1942).
16 Marshall v. Hill, 59 Pa. Super. 481 (1915); Hultz v. Gibbs, 66 Pa. 360 (1870); Schleiden
v. Schleiden, 72 Pitts. 637 (1924); Walker v. Simpson, supra; Jones v. Markley, supra; Cunningham v. Irwin, supra.
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necessaries. 17 There is no apparent reason why these same requirements would
not have to be proved in a case where the wife instead of the third person, is
seeking restitution.
However, these and many other factors in determining the wife's right to
recovery from a deserted husband for moneys spent out of her own separate estate
for support of herself and child might very well be altered if the wife should
choose to attempt recovery under the old statutes. Though they are still in force
today, and might conceivably be employed by some enterprising attorney, in view
of the decision in the principal case in favor of the wife recovering without the
aid of any statutory right of action, such a course of action seems highly improbable.
J. Willard Schoelkopf
Member of the Junior Class
17 Walker v. Simpson, supra; Clothier v. Wolff, 66 Pa. Super. 328 (1917).

